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Askēsis and organizational culture 
 
Robert Halsall and Mary Brown, Aberdeen Business School 
 
Abstract 
 
This article makes the case for the contribution of the cultural theory of Sloterdijk and 
the tradition of philosophical anthropology on which it is based to an understanding of 
the processes of culture formation in organizations. Rather than see culture formation 
as the model of an autonomous self which sacrifices or gives up this autonomy as a 
result of identification with the organizational culture, or retains it by resisting or 
distancing from the culture, the article argues that we should see organizational 
selves as engaged in processes of askēsis, understood as ‘systems of spiritual 
exercises, … practised in collectives of personalised regimes’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 12), 
the aim of which is the fulfilment of the imperative ‘you must change your life!’ 
(Sloterdijk 2009). The article illustrates the application of the theory to the formation 
of ‘secessionist’ cultures, cultures devoted to the pursuit of radical ascetic aims, by 
outlining the mechanisms of askēsis in contemporary organizations: the splitting of 
the self into ‘willing’ and ‘unwilling’ elements which are in constant ‘endo-rhetorical’ 
dialogue; the imitation of exemplars of ascetic behaviour, or the ‘perfectionist vita’; 
‘conversion’ to the organizational culture, whether as a sudden experience or as a 
gradual process, and organizational cultures understood as ‘cultures of observance’, 
the aim of which are to encourage the employee to scrutinize habitual behaviour and 
change this behaviour in line with the ideals of the secessionist culture. The end point 
of askēsis is reached when the employee conceives organizational life itself as a 
continual ‘test’ of commitment and will. Key words. Askēsis; asceticism; 
organizational culture; formation of organizational self; conversion; autonomy; 
Sloterdijk.  
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1. Introduction: Asceticism in work and management thought 
 
In Charles Handy’s Beyond Certainty: The Changing World of Organisations (Handy 
1995), we find a chapter entitled ‘Make Your Business a Monastery’, in which he 
describes an executive seminar run by an international hotel chain which was 
addressed by a Benedictine monk. The monk’s talk was received enthusiastically by 
the audience of hotel managers, because, Handy claims, ‘their hotels, you could see 
them thinking, could be like his monastery’ (Handy 1995: 188). What he means by 
this, of course, is not that hotels should literally become like monasteries, locking 
their guests in cells, the hotel restaurant enforcing a vow of silence at meals, or 
forcing the guests to get up at dawn to pray, but the idea that they could make ‘hotel-
keeping into a mission’ and that to ‘work for a cause can be wonderfully exciting, 
much more exciting than working for the shareholders’ (ibid.). 
 
In The Benedictine Rule of Leadership (Galbraith 2004), which attempts to apply the 
monastic rules of St. Benedict to management, we find a similar allusion to business 
seen as a monastic community, admission to which involves subscribing to a process 
of ‘formation’ of the self:     
 
The Benedictine concept of corporate formation is ... strategic. ... . Formation is 
the formal process designed to teach values and vision. It provides the 
metaphors, language and skills to develop a way of thinking in line with the 
corporate interest. It creates a sense of employee self-development. ... And, 
unlike training, formation is education as to the ‘why’ things happen rather than 
just the ‘how’. (Galbraith 2004: 13)    
 
In the Benedictine concept of ‘formation’ of the individual to be fit for a corporate 
vision, a process going beyond ‘mere’ training, we are, then, supposed to see 
business as imbued with a ‘higher’ purpose, which the employee has to internalize. 
The appeal of monastic asceticism for these management theorists is, it seems, 
related not to withdrawal from the world, but to the necessity of giving work meaning 
beyond the material, beyond the mere making of profit, and the sense of elevation 
engendered by this: ‘The sense of being used for a mighty purpose makes up for ... 
small inefficiencies, ... often lousy pay and poor conditions’ (Handy 1995: 189). Other 
recent management writers have sought to apply monastic principles to management 
in a similar fashion. Kennedy (1999) and Tredget (2002), for example, both propose 
that Fayol’s management ideas may derive from the Rule of St Benedict, while 
Moberg and Calkins (2001) revisit the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola as a 
tool for examining business ethics.  
 
The idea of asceticism as bringing with it an elevating devotion to work alluded to in 
these texts seems at first glance reminiscent of Weber’s idea of a higher vocation or 
calling as lending dignity to the ‘spirit of capitalism’ and as a means of psychological 
motivation of those within it who regarded themselves as the elect. The central 
elements of Weberian ‘inner-worldly’ asceticism, however, such as the necessity of 
‘the destruction of the spontaneity of the instinct-driven enjoyment of life’ (Weber 
2001: 72), seems hardly compatible with contemporary organizational life, 
supposedly imbued as it is with the values of ‘fun’, ‘excitement’ and ‘pleasure’ 
(Rodrigues and Collinson 1995). Weber saw the monastery as an institution in which 
the monk had to ‘subordinate life to the supremacy of an organized will’ and in which 
actions were subject to ‘a permanent control and a reflection upon their ethical 
implications’ (Weber 2001:72). As Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), in their 
examination of the development of managerial discourse from the 1960s to the 
1990s point out, from the 1960s onward the Weberian notion of asceticism could no 
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longer fulfil the function of giving a moral support to a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ based 
on the ‘materialistic hedonism of the consumer society’ (2005: 28). 
 
Furthermore, it seems that the central virtue of monastic asceticism, unquestioning 
obedience to a superior, is at first glance hardly compatible with a workplace founded 
on the professed idea of the ‘practical autonomy’ of the worker and ‘micro-
emancipation’ (Willmott 1993, Alvesson and Willmott 2002). In Cassian’s Monastic 
Institutes, in particular Book IV, ‘Of the Training of the Monks’ we find a clear 
statement of the requirement for such absolute obedience: 
 
Juniors may not, without the knowledge or permission of their master, so 
much as leave the room, nor even presume to satisfy the common demands 
of nature on their own authority. They are so eager to carry out without 
question whatever he asks them to do, as if they were commanded by God 
from heaven, that when occasionally impossibilities are asked of them, they 
obey with such trusting devotion that they try to carry them out 
wholeheartedly and without the slightest hesitation. (Cassian 1999: 45)  
 
The traditional monastic virtues of humility, patience, eagerness to serve, and 
devotion, however, might well be those which managerialist writers see as desirable 
to apply to contemporary organizations.  
 
The apparent contradiction between a spirit of capitalism which seemingly rejects the 
self-denial of Weberian asceticism and a renewed interest of management theorists 
in asceticism can perhaps be explained by the postulation of a new form of 
asceticism in recent managerial discourse. The ‘new spirit of capitalism’ which 
pervades managerial texts from the 1990s onward, according to Boltanski and 
Chiapello, is characterized by a form of moralistic asceticism, based not on work as a 
source of salvation, as in Weber, but on the moralizing of the exemplum: the 
necessity of following the example of exceptional beings (managers) who are 
‘proficient at numerous tasks, constantly educating themselves, adaptable, with a 
capacity for self-organization and working with very different people’ (Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2005: 76).  
 
The authority of this ‘exceptional being’ is not expressed by means of giving orders 
and strict rules, as in the monastic order, but by being a ‘catalyst’, ‘visionary’, ‘coach’, 
or ‘source of inspiration’ to employees (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 77). The 
‘leader’ must derive authority not from issuing orders, in other words, but from 
establishing a culture in which ‘everyone must know what they must do without 
having to be told’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 76). The form of asceticism 
prevalent in contemporary managerial discourse, we will argue, is primarily moralistic 
and cultural in nature, rather than religious: its primary purpose is to establish 
organizational cultures in which, as Boltanski and Chiapello say, everyone ‘knows 
what to do without having to be told’. In examining the new interest in asceticism in 
contemporary organizations, then, we should not, as Kelly et al. (2007: 272) say, look 
for a ‘singular (Protestant) work ethic’ or indeed any ethic derived from a religious 
value system, but, rather, examine the processes through which ‘organizations 
prescribe individuals to engage in a project of the self’ (Bardon and Josserand 2010: 
510). 
 
2. Autonomy, askēsis, and the formation of the organizational self 
 
The relationship between the organizational self and the formation of organizational 
cultures has been the subject of extensive treatment in the literature, some of which 
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makes direct or indirect reference to asceticism and monasticism. The process of 
identity formation in relation to organizational cultures, or ‘identity work’ (Alvesson 
and Willmott 2002: 622) is seen as essentially related to the autonomous self of the 
employee:  it is the price the employee has to pay for the ‘expanded practical 
autonomy’ (Willmott 1993: 517) which postmodern management theory and practice 
supposedly grants (Alvesson and Willmott 2002: 624). There is, in other words, a 
paradox at the heart of identity formation in the postmodern organization: the self is, 
on the one hand, given greater apparent freedom or autonomy than under Taylorist 
management; on the other hand, this autonomy is accompanied by an imperative for 
the organizational self to become increasingly concerned with itself as an object of 
knowledge, or as Knights and Willmott (1989) put it, following Foucault, to become a 
‘self-disciplining subjectivity’, and thus allowing the cultural power of the organization 
to operate upon the subject formatively. 
Of the targets of such ‘identity work’ set out by Alvesson and Willmott (2002), three 
relate particularly to a process of self-formation which can be understood as a 
moralistic process of cultural askēsis. First, ‘identity work’ is often accomplished by 
the organizational self comparing itself with others within the organization, usually 
resulting in an increased insecurity and diminished self-worth. This process of self- 
formation by comparison with models or exemplars of perfection which are to be 
imitated, an essential feature of askēsis, we will term, following Sloterdijk (2009), the 
imitation of the perfectionist vita.  
Second, there is a strong moral dimension to ‘identity work’, accomplished through 
the imitation of ‘stories with a strong morality’ (Alvesson and Willmott 2002: 629). The 
imitation of exemplary ascetic narratives, such as acts of devotion and extreme self-
denial by superiors, are an essential part of organizational askēsis. Such narratives 
have a ‘strong morality’ in that they are only subject to imitation, not questioning. 
Third, ‘identity work’ is governed by rules about the ‘natural’ way of doing things, 
which may operate just as much indirectly as directly, as a ‘by-product’ of other 
activities (Alvesson and Willmott 2002: 631). Just as monastic orders contain both 
explicit and implicit ascetic rules, we will argue, so organisational cultures understood 
as ‘cultures of observance’ contain implicit ascetic rules or prescriptions which, in 
contrast to explicit rules, are not rational and thus not open to challenge or question. 
Such implicit rules can serve as ways of strengthening the culture, whilst at the same 
time allowing the employee the illusion of autonomy. 
The similarity of these features of ‘identity work’ in contemporary organizational 
cultures to ascetic practices has been noted in the preponderance of ‘self-help’ 
literature (Garsten and Grey 1997) and the associated ‘therapeutic habitus’ (Costea 
et al. 2008). Garsten and Grey (1997) see their presence in the postmodern 
organization as a continuation of the ‘secularized Protestant ethic’ of Weber. As 
organizations become more fragmented (Martin 2002) management realises that 
external rules need to be replaced by ‘internalized rules of behaviour based on 
common values’ and monastic life is seen as a model of a form of life in which such 
internalized rules are prevalent (Garsten and Grey 1997: 214). The discourse of self-
help and therapy, then, may replicate the ‘Christian conscience’ present in the 
ascetic community, albeit in a ‘distinctly secularized version’ (Garsten and Grey 
1997: 218).  
While Garsten and Grey invoke Weber in explanation of this form of secularized 
askēsis, Ray (1986) cites Durkheim’s sociology of religious forms with a similar 
argumentative function: the lack of shared values and beliefs previously 
characteristic of religious value systems are something which managers seek to 
replicate in contemporary organizations by declaring the enterprise ‘sacred’ and 
organizational culture a source of ‘non-deified religious spirituality’ (Ray 1986: 290).  
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The ‘spiritual’ or ‘religious’ function of organizational culture, therefore, seems to be 
closely related to the professed ‘humanism’ of postmodern management, replacing 
the ‘de-humanizing’ nature of Taylorism: management realise that employees need 
some form of emotional or symbolic identification, which is supplied by the firm 
representing itself as a source of Durkheim’s ‘realm of the sacred’. Unfortunately for 
the employee seeking such spiritual sustenance, however, this turns out to be just 
another ‘frontier’ of control (Ray 1986), perhaps more pervasive than under 
Taylorism. 
There seem to be two problems in this argument for a ‘spiritual turn’ in relation to 
organizational cultures. First, supposing that people in postmodern society do seek 
such ‘spiritual identification’, the question why should they seek this in the workplace 
rather than elsewhere seems to be unanswered. Second, by equating the 
‘humanistic’ intentions of postmodern management with concern for a  purported 
‘inwardness’ or ‘spirituality’ of the employee present in the autonomous self, this 
seems to give too much credence to these intentions, which turn out, unsurprisingly,  
to be anti-humanist. By replacing the discourse of the ‘religious’, the ‘spiritual’, and 
the ‘sacred’ with the terms ‘pseudo-religious’ or ‘pseudo-spiritual’, initiatives to 
strengthen organizational cultures might be more appropriately described as ‘de-
spritualized regimes of askēsis’ (Sloterdijk 2009): while such practices might imitate 
the form of religious or spiritual practices, they have no religious or spiritual content 
as such, being designed solely to encourage compliance with organizational culture, 
while allowing the employee to still believe in his/her autonomy. 
The connection between religious or ‘spiritual’ discourse in corporate culture 
initiatives and associated HRM programmes and control has been developed further 
by several writers with reference to Foucault’s works on the ‘care of the self’. 
Townley, for instance, talks of the aim of training as promoting the idea of employees 
as ‘harboring a secret truth’, which training is designed to get them to ‘confess’ 
(1993: 536). The ‘management’ of emotions, in particular the suppression of 
‘inappropriate’ emotions such as anger and indignation (whether justified or not), and 
their replacement by appropriate emotions, is an important part of this required 
‘confessional attitude’. Townley (1993, 1995), cites in this respect Foucault’s 
reference to Marcus Aurelius in The Care of the Self, in particular the ‘art of 
governing oneself’ (Foucault  1984: 89) expressed in the genre of hyponemata, or 
notes to oneself analysing one’s day to day conduct, one of the basic techniques of 
Stoic askēsis, and the similar form of exercises put forward by Epictetus (Foucault 
1984: 91).  
Foucault , and Townley following him, wishes, however,  to make a clear distinction 
between these Stoic forms of askēsis, which are seen positively as part of ethical 
‘self-formation’, and the later, Christian form of askēsis,  or ‘self-awareness’, which 
dominates contemporary HRM practices. In the latter, the self is to be distrusted, the 
subject of constant ‘vigilance’, and is to be submitted to a regime of development 
towards perfection and union with God. Garsten and Grey (1997), however, rightly 
doubt whether such a clear distinction between ‘self-formation’ and ‘self-awareness’ 
can be drawn in practice. Further, from the point of view of the genealogy of askēsis, 
there are clear continuities between Stoic and early Christian forms of exercise, as 
writers such as Hadot (1995, 1998) have shown, casting doubt on the clarity of the 
distinction made by Foucault.  
The ‘management of emotions’ in the therapeutic discourse of HRM seen as a 
programme of ‘self-awareness’ has been seen by some writers as akin to a religious 
process of conversion (Ackers and Preston 1997).The religious metaphor 
‘conversion’ is seemingly employed here to describe the moment when the 
supposedly autonomous organizational self is brought to the realization of the 
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necessity of full identification with the organizational culture, a moment accompanied 
by an intense emotional experience as the employee suddenly ‘sees the light’ of the 
higher perspective offered by management. The ‘sudden’ and ‘overwhelming’ nature 
of this ‘conversion’ seems to confirm the rhetorical power of the idea of managers as 
‘saviours’ of the employees’ souls (Sørensen 2008), and indeed confirm that 
employees’ souls are to be submitted for ‘salvation’ in the first place. In reality, we will 
argue, the process of ‘conversion’ to an organizational culture is more likely to be a 
long process of askēsis which employees embark upon (involuntarily), at the end of 
which there is no ‘way out’ of the resultant identity conflict other than to ‘convert’ to 
the culture. 
Rather than a binary opposition between the supposedly autonomous self and the 
self which fully identifies with or has been ‘converted to’ the culture, what we have in 
reality are individuals ‘split’ within themselves between identification and dis-
identification, or between ‘role embracement’ and ‘role distancing’ (Kunda 1992: 
198). The organizational self is thus ‘unstable’, conducting a ‘tightrope walk’ or 
‘balancing act’ between identification and dis-identification (Kunda 1992: 216). An 
insight into this ‘splitting’ of the self into elements which identify and elements which 
resist or dis-identify with the culture, and the dynamic relationship between them can, 
it will be argued, be gained by examining canonical ascetic texts which speak of the 
self precisely in these terms. 
Fleming and Spicer (2003) cast further radical doubt on the notion of an autonomous 
organizational self, able to withdraw or distance itself from corporate culture by 
means of cynicism, while outwardly continuing to ‘perform’ the rituals of the culture. 
Thus the question of whether the organizational self fully ‘believes’ in the culture or 
has been ‘converted’ to it becomes of secondary importance.  Drawing on Althusser’s 
and Žižek’s notion of ideology as something radically external rather than internal, 
they point out that the cynical subject, whether he/she ‘believes’ in the organizational 
culture or not, nevertheless often  ‘performs’ it, perhaps better than the subject who 
does ‘believe’ in it. This scepticism regarding the autonomous self as a site of 
resistance, leads Fleming and Spicer to the potentially depressing conclusion ‘if 
believing can be practised ‘for us’, then is there really any escape from corporate 
colonization?’ (2003: 170). Fleming and Spicer’s argument deconstructs the 
supposed opposition between ‘outside’ (the outward behaviour of the organizational 
self) and ‘inside’, a unified autonomous self ‘beyond’ the reach of corporate culture 
programmes.  
Contu (2008) goes further in burying the autonomous organizational self and 
describes such views as ‘residual “bourgeois humanism”’, a belief that, in counter-
balance to the fragmented postmodern subject there is ‘a whole powerful ego that 
enables us to follow wishes and desires in choosing and deciding what one has to do 
with onself’ (Contu 2008: 372). In the camp of such ‘residual bourgeois humanism’, in 
her view, are those who see in Foucault’s ethical programme of the ‘care of the self’ 
a form of ‘softer resistance, resistance without the acid that can destroy the machine 
of power’ (Contu 2008: 374).  
Recent literature has pursued this deconstruction of a simple divide between outside 
‘geometrical’ organizational space and the ‘inner’ space of an autonomous self. 
Fleming and Spicer (2004) allude to the permeability of boundaries between the 
organization and private life, both in terms of geometrical space (e.g. the workplace 
and the home) and imagined space. Their reference to Bachelard (2004: 88) is 
significant:  just as important as whether the employees’ actual private space/time is 
being eroded by organizational culture is whether they imagine it to be so. Fleming 
and Spicer give the example of an away day held on a Sunday in the organization 
they studied: ‘Failing to attend this activity was a sign that they (the employees) are 
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not fully committed to the firm and lacked the required ‘attitude’’ (2004: 85). The away 
day, therefore, was interpreted as a ‘test’ of the degree of the employees’ degree of 
commitment to the organizational culture (whether it actually was designed as such 
or not, it was imagined to be).  
Such an interpretation of (organizational) life as a continual test of commitment to 
organizational culture is a fundamental aim of askēsis as interpreted by Foucault in 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject. For the Stoics and even more in later, Christian, 
forms of askēsis, according to Foucault, the aim of the various forms of ‘spiritual 
exercise’ undertaken  was to reach the stage where ‘the test must become a general 
attitude towards reality’ (Foucault 2005: 431). The end product of askēsis is: a 
‘questioning of the self by the self ... knowing what you are capable of, whether you 
can do a particular kind of thing and see it through ... measuring how far you have 
advanced’ (Foucault 2005: 430). In the sections which follow, we will outline the 
mechanisms of askēsis through which such a process occurs in contemporary 
organizations, to the point where ‘the test’ of commitment to the culture becomes a 
general attitude. 
 
3. Religious and cultural views of asceticism and askēsis 
 
Before analysing the forms and mechanisms of askēsis in contemporary 
organizations, we will attempt to clarify the terms ‘asceticism’ and ‘askēsis’ and 
address the question whether contemporary organizational asceticism is primarily a 
religious phenomenon and the implications of this.  
 
The view that asceticism is essentially related to religion is put forward by Flood 
(2004: 2): 
 
Asceticism is always set within, or in some cases reaction to, a religious 
tradition, within a shared memory that both looks back to an origin and looks 
forward to a future goal ...(it is) a quintessentially religious act. There are 
clearly analogues of asceticism in the contemporary, secularised world, but 
these are not asceticism, because they do not perform the memory of tradition. 
 
For Flood, asceticism must have ‘a sacred origin’ (215), relate to a religious tradition 
or ritual, and is thus defined as an ‘erosion of individuality through an act of will’ (212) 
exercised within a religious tradition.  
 
Viewed in this religious sense, asceticism consists of two elements: anachōrēsis 
(withdrawal from the world) and enkrateia (self-control) (Ware 1998: 4). For the early 
Christian ascetics, withdrawal from the world, whether in the literal form either as 
individuals in the desert (anchorites) or later into monastic communities (cenobites), 
became synonymous with the transformation of the external world into the spiritual. 
The archetypal account of such a withdrawal was Anthanasius’s Life of St. Anthony, 
in which Antony’s withdrawal into the desert and confrontation with temptation in the 
form of demons becomes the paradigm for a ‘combative’ form of ascetic life 
(Harpham 1987: 14).    
 
The second element of asceticism as a religious practice, self-denial or the ‘erosion 
of individuality through an act of will’ is that element which has subsequently been 
the subject of ‘disparagement by modernity’ (Flood 2004: 212). Nietzsche’s scathing 
polemic from the Third Treatise of The Genealogy of Morality, in particular, is 
perhaps the clearest statement in the modern era of the pathological connection 
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between religious asceticism and a pathology characterized by sexual denial, 
negation of the self and a glorification of suffering: 
 
An ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here an unparalleled ressentiment rules, 
that of an unfulfilled instinct and power-will that wants to be master, not over 
something in life, but over life itself and its deepest, strongest, most profound 
conditions; … satisfaction is looked for and found in failure, decay, pain, 
misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-
flagellation and self-sacrifice. (Nietzsche 2007: 85) 
 
For Nietzsche the supposed ‘spiritual’ origins of Christian morality in asceticism 
disguise the fact its ‘primary motive is not love of one’s spiritual self,’ but 
ressentiment, a ‘hatred of the body’, and thus ‘the supposed concern of the ascetic 
for ‘“salvation of the soul” is a pretense’ (Scheler 1961: 103). 
 
On the basis of these two defining elements of asceticism as a religious practice, we 
could expect that it would not be a significant phenomenon in contemporary 
organizational life. First, there has been a process of secularization, towards an age 
which the theologian Paul Tillich characterized in 1925 in The Religious Situation of 
the Age as one of ‘‘self-contained finality,’ or a ‘general demise ... of traditional 
cosmologies, ... the rise of human sciences and Enlightenment reason and ... the 
demise of broader religious tradition with the twofold death of ‘God’ and ‘Man’ (Flood 
2004: 235). Second, there appears to have been in modernity an increasing rejection 
of those ‘pathological’ expressions of religious asceticism attacked by Nietzsche. As 
Sloterdijk puts it, ‘most contemporaries ... would see the desire to escape the world 
as a form of illness’ (Sloterdijk 1995: 105).  
 
In the postmodern era, however, it seems that the speeding up of communication 
processes and life in general and the associated nausea have been accompanied by 
renewal of the desire to escape the world, as reflected in the various technologies 
available to us designed to help us ‘escape’ from it (Sloterdijk 2004: 357-508). It 
would be wrong, however, to necessarily identify this new interest in asceticism, 
necessarily as a renewal of ‘spirituality’ or religious impulse. To understand such 
contemporary forms, we need a broadening of the definition and theory of asceticism 
beyond its purely religious form towards a wider cultural phenomenon.  
 
There are various elements which can contribute towards such a re-definition. First, a 
genealogy of religious ascetic practices shows that they have a history beyond those 
present in Christian asceticism, particularly in the concept of ‘spiritual exercises’ in 
Ancient philosophy. Finn Op (2009: 1) while restricting the definition of asceticism to 
the ‘voluntary abstention for religious reasons from food and drink, sleep, wealth, or 
sexual activity’, admits that while such practices clearly became part of a religious 
tradition in early Christianity, and to some extent in Hellenistic and Rabbinic Judaism, 
they are prefigured by similar Pagan practices, in particular, the ‘philosophical’ 
asceticism practiced in Ancient Greece by the Cynics and the Pythagoreans (Finn Op 
2009: 9-33). 
 
Hadot (1995, 1998), makes a similar connection with earlier forms by replacing the 
term asceticism, associated primarily with Christian practices, and associated with 
those ‘pathological’ expressions of the ascetic impulse attacked by Nietzsche, with 
the Greek term askēsis, which he understands as ‘the practice of spiritual exercises – 
(which) already existed in the philosophical tradition of antiquity. … (and is) still alive 
in contemporary consciousness’ (Hadot 1995: 82).  
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Askēsis understood as ‘spiritual exercises’ in Ancient philosophy, Hadot points out, 
does not necessarily imply a ‘metaphysical’ or ‘religious’ sense with which it has 
become associated in Christianity and other religions, but the sense that exercises 
were ‘practical, required effort and training, and were lived; they were spiritual 
because they involved the entire spirit, one’s whole way of being’ (Hadot 1995: 21). 
This element of Hadot’s definition is crucial to a ‘cultural’ rather than ‘religious’ theory 
of contemporary asceticism: a programme of training or discipline undergone, 
voluntarily or otherwise, with the purpose of bringing the self into a desired shape or 
form. This emphasis on technique or technologies is reflected in the term used by 
Foucault to describe askēsis,  ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault 1998), and in 
Sloterdijk’s equivalent term ‘anthropotechnics’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 23).  
 
The second contributory element to a cultural re-definition of asceticism is the 
connection of askēsis to power, and the relationship of power to the formation of 
cultures. Harpham (1987), for instance, emphasizes this relation by defining 
asceticism as ‘any act of self-denial undertaken as a strategy of empowerment or 
gratification’ (xiii), the essence of which is narratability of this act within a culture as 
performance. The archetypal ascetic narrative, hagiography, for instance, 
‘documents a class of people trying to achieve complete narratability’ (Harpham 
1987: 73).  
 
Valantasis (1995a) also highlights the importance of ascetic practices in the 
formation of ‘counter cultures’ to established cultures. This element of breaking away 
from established cultures through ascetic practices, however, does not necessarily 
imply the literal establishment of a (physically) separate or ideologically oppositional 
culture (as was the case in the early Christian anakhōrēsis). As Valatasis (1995a) 
notes, ‘cultures may coinhere, and an ascetic may participate in a number of different 
cultures simultaneously’ (549). In other words, the ascetic may, through engaging in 
ascetic practices or ‘technologies’ ‘secede’ from the world of the established culture 
while remaining superficially within it. Alternatively, those in power may superimpose 
new implicit ‘ascetic’ norms or rules within an existing culture, requiring those within 
the culture to aspire to these norms while superficially retaining the structures of the 
‘old’ culture.  
 
Valantasis outlines four main elements of this ‘culture-forming’ power of askēsis. 
First, through ritual formation and new social relations the ascetic learns to live in a 
new social world. Second, through the centrality of ‘exemplary’ narrative 
performances such as those emphasized by Harpham, and their associated demonic 
and angelic psychologies, askēsis translates theological concepts within this new 
culture into prescribed patterns of behaviour (even in cultures where the theological 
basis of such behaviour is unstated). Taken together these elements lead Valantasis 
(1995b) to a definition of asceticism which relates, culture, narrative performance and 
power: ‘performances within a dominant social environment intended to inaugurate a 
new subjectivity, different social relations, and an alternative social universe’ (797).  
 
4. Towards a cultural theory of askēsis and organizational culture 
 
4.1 The contribution of Foucault 
 
Foucault’s concern with asceticism and his examination of ascetic practices is 
considered to be a feature of his late work, in which we see a shift from an 
examination in his earlier work of ‘discipline exercised by others’ to, in the later work, 
‘forms of self-discipline exercised in the pursuit of pleasure and ethics’ (Starkey and 
Hatchuel 2002: 642). This later work, in particular Technologies of the Self (Foucault 
1988) The History of Sexuality III: The Care of the Self (Foucault 1997) and The 
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Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982 (Foucault 
2005) are part of an ethical project in which Foucault’s aim is to establish a form of 
‘non dogmatic normativity’ compatible with ethical freedom.  
 
Foucault’s engagement with the ascetic tradition rests on a distinction between two 
different concepts of self. The first, close to the utopian notion of the autonomous 
subject invoked by postmodern management theorists outlined above is 
characterized by the ‘absolute value attributed to the individual in his singularity and 
by the degree of independence conceded to him vis-à-vis the group to which he 
belongs and the institutions to which he is answerable’ (Foucault 1997: 42). This is 
the notion which Foucault wishes to locate in the Stoic form of askēsis: ‘the  
formation of a full, perfect, complete, and self-sufficient relationship with oneself’ 
(Foucault 2005: 319). Early Christian asceticism and the tradition of monastic 
cenobitism, on the other hand, expressly reject this notion of the individual, as 
Foucault says, in ‘a disqualification of the values of private life; and ... an explicit 
rejection of any individualism that might be inherent in the practice of reclusion’ 
(Foucault 1997: 43).  
 
In order to accentuate this distinction, Foucault abandons, in Hermeneutics of the 
Subject, the word ‘asceticism’, which is associated with the Christian form, and turns, 
as does Hadot, to the Greek word askēsis. For Foucault, however, the sense of 
askēsis meaning ‘spiritual exercise’ concentrates too much on technique, ‘this or that 
particular exercise or to the individual’s undertaking of a series of exercises’ 
(Foucault 2005: 416). He instead adopts the general term ‘ascetics’, which places 
equal weight on the techniques and on their purposes, defined as: 
 
The more or less coordinated set of exercises that are available, 
recommended, or even obligatory, and any way utilizable by individuals in a 
moral, philosophical and religious system in order to achieve a definite 
spiritual objective (Foucault 2005: 416). 
 
Notwithstanding the worth of Foucault’s ethical project, which rests upon the 
distinction of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ senses of askēsis, his engagement with the ascetic 
tradition is clearly of great value in building a ‘cultural’ theory of ascetic practices in 
organizations, and has clearly been recognised as such (Townley 1995, Starkey and 
Hatchuel 2002, Kelly et al. 2007, Bardon and Josserand 2011). The difficulty, 
however, comes in the very definition above, that ‘ascetics’ can be just ‘available’ or 
‘utilizable’ or may also be ‘recommended’ or ‘obligatory’. The subject, then, appears 
to have the freedom to choose whether and to what degree to submit to these 
regimes of exercise. We are thus returned to a belief in the autonomous subject, and 
that even if the organizational self has no choice about whether to engage in such 
programmes, there will always be an ‘inner self’ beyond their reach upon which they 
cannot act, an assumption which recent literature, as discussed above, has 
challenged. 
 
4.2 The contribution of Sloterdijk 
 
Sloterdijk’s interest in asceticism and its implications for cultural theory has its 
starting point his work Weltfremdheit (Estrangement from the World) (Sloterdijk 
1995). In that work the process of withdrawal from the world which characterizes the 
religious tradition of asceticism is seen as in essence a process of metoikesis, ‘a 
movement to another form of dwelling, a transmutation to another form of self- 
awareness … a migration between states or dimensions of being’ (Sloterdijk 1995: 
82-83).1 Such a process, as experienced by the Anchorites in their withdrawal into 
the desert, can be understood as a ‘metaphorical institution’ (Sloterdijk 1995: 88) 
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which underlies cultural formation in general. This leads Sloterdijk to two main 
propositions, that ‘the impetus to escape the world is present in the world throughout 
history’ and that ‘there has been a universalization of the monastic into an 
anthropological archetype’ (Sloterdijk 1995: 111). 
 
Both in Weltfremdheit and in the Sphären trilogy which follows it (Sloterdijk 1998-
2005) Sloterdijk’s understanding of cultural formation draws on the German tradition 
of philosophical anthropology of Scheler, Plessner, and Gehlen (Fischer 2009). The 
understanding of culture in this tradition derives from a phenomenological analysis of 
the ‘dual aspect’ of man: being situated in the world, and at the same time feeling 
detached from it: the human is ‘a centred, living subject, but at the same time, by 
observing himself out of the corner of his eye, at a distance, he finds himself as a 
body among material bodies, marginalized, de-centred, objectified, … a thing among 
things’ (Fischer 2009: 158). 
 
This dual aspect of man as an anthropological category is termed by Plessner ‘ex-
centric positionality’, ‘ex-centricity’ here having no connotations of ‘eccentricity’, odd 
or capricious behaviour, but describing the ability of the human subject to draw a 
boundary or adopt a different position in relation to its surroundings or a former 
aspect of the self: ‘to distance oneself from oneself, to posit a gap between oneself 
and one’s experiences’ (Fischer 2000: 276). The self counters the instability inherent 
in its ‘ex-centric positionality’ by forming cultures: ‘placeless, timeless, faced with the 
void, the eccentric life-form creates for itself a foundation … artificiality in action, 
thought and dream is the inner means, by which the human being harmonizes itself 
with its nature’ (Plessner 1982: 25).2 Plessner’s term for culture is ‘natural artificiality’ 
to illustrate the point that cultures are ‘by “nature” “artificial” or constructed’ (Fischer 
2009: 161). Askēsis, a process of withdrawal or secession from the world, of 
distancing oneself from a former aspect of the self, is, then, a paradigmatic form of 
cultural formation in response to ‘ex-centric positionality’. 
 
The ‘ex-centric positionality’ of the self and cultural formation as a counter to this is 
an essential anthropological building block of human sphere-building activity, 
Sloterdijk’s main concern in the Sphären trilogy (Sloterdijk 1998-2004). Human 
beings’ basic form of inhabitation is defined by Sloterdijk there as the sphere, ‘a 
circular, internally divided entity, interiorized and made accessible, which human 
beings inhabit’ (Sloterdijk 1998: 28), formed by converting exterior space into 
interiorized place. The fundamental form of the sphere as defined in Sphären I is the 
bubble, a thin, unstable protective outer layer protecting the self from the outside, 
containing within itself opposing poles, a ‘polarized and differentiated, internally 
divided, subjectivized space of experience’ (Sloterdijk 1998: 46).  
 
Spheres are combined into agglomerations to form ‘foam’, Sloterdijk’s term for 
‘society’ (Sloterdijk 2004). Relations between the cells in ‘foam’ are not primarily 
those of communication but imitation, contagion and the result of the pursuit of 
immunity strategies (Borch 2009). Cultures within organizations, then, are created by 
the imitation of examplars, secession from existing cultures and norms, and the 
establishment of new cultures. If, in Sphären, as Borch says, the ‘inner working of the 
cells’ is not explored, then in Sloterdijk’s more recent book, Du mußt dein Leben 
ändern (You must change your life)(Sloterdijk 2009), it is. In this book, by examining 
the structure of askēsis in both religious and philosophical traditions, Sloterdijk hopes 
to demonstrate ‘the fundamental importance of the life of practice for the formation of 
styles of being or ‘cultures’’ (Sloterdijk 2009:59). 
 
The title of the book alludes to the existence in contemporary culture of an ascetic 
imperative, in which ‘life is defined as a gap between higher and lower forms’ and in 
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which ‘the only imperative is change in myself’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 47). The analogy 
between Sloterdijk’s principle and Foucault’s notion of the end point of askēsis as the 
conception of life itself as a ‘test’ is apparent. The ascetic imperative to ‘change one’s 
life’ might have previously been defined in religious belief systems by a relationship 
to God, but the ‘regimes of exercise’ which characterize the contemporary form of the 
imperative are not religious but ‘misunderstood systems of spiritual exercises, 
whether these are practiced in collectives or in personalised regimes’ (Sloterdijk 
2009: 12). An ‘exercise’ is defined by Sloterdijk as ‘any operation, through which the 
qualification of the person carrying it out for the next performance of that operation is 
conserved or improved, whether it is declared as an exercise or not’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 
13). The relationship to systems of power is encompassed by the general term used 
by Sloterdijk to describe regimes of exercise, ‘anthropotechnics’, defined as ‘the 
mental and physical exercise processes, by means of which people … have tried to 
optimise their cosmic and social status ... by ‘work on the self’’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 23).        
 
To sum up, what Sloterdijk hopes to achieve in Du mußt dein Leben ändern is a 
comprehensive theory of askēsis in contemporary culture, set within the context of 
his general theory of human sphere-building as put forward in Sphären, and in the 
tradition of philosophical anthropology. In the remaining sections of this article we will 
expound the main elements of this theory with reference to canonical ascetic texts, 
and apply these mechanisms to organizations, and in particular the understanding of 
the relationship between the organizational self and the formation of organizational 
cultures. 
 
5. Mechanisms of askēsis and culture formation in organizations 
 
5.1 Secession and the endo-rhetorical structure of the self 
 
 
The basic notion of Sloterdijk’s theory is that of secession, understood not in terms of 
either literal withdrawal from the world, as in the monastery, or by establishing a 
culture dedicated to the radical pursuit of artistic aims, as in the Vienna Secession, 
for example, but as an inner operation through which the ascetic self separates itself 
from habit, from a former life and from the norms of an existing culture, and thus 
creates a new subjectivity by means of exercises. The archetypal form of this 
exercise, as present in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, is: ‘the making of a 
differentiation between two radically different spheres of influence: what I can 
influence by means of my own powers, and what can only be influenced by the 
powers of others’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 349). By differentiating between what can and 
what cannot be influenced by my actions, by attaining an inner attitude of ‘objectivity’ 
understood in the Stoic sense, the self is freed from attachment. The classic example 
of this exercise is in Epictetus’s Enchidirion Chapter 3:   
 
In the case of particular things that delight you, or benefit you, or to which you 
have grown attached, remind yourself of what they are. Start with things of 
little value. If it is china you like, for instance, say, ‘I am fond of a piece of 
China.’ When it breaks, then you won’t be as disconcerted. When giving your 
wife or child a kiss, repeat to yourself, ‘I am kissing a mortal.’ Then you won’t 
be so distraught if they are taken from you. (Epictetus 2008: 222) 
 
This secession has two consequences: first, having accepted that it should concern 
itself only with those things which depend upon it, the external world is ‘rendered 
indifferent’ and ‘is only capable of constituting the antithesis of retreat, flight, and 
contempt’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 353). The potential which this offers for the establishment 
and strengthening of organizational cultures, a principal reason, as we have seen, 
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why management theorists are interested in monasticism, is obvious. Secondly, 
secession opens up an inner space within the self, ‘liberates an immense excess of 
self-referentiality’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 353), upon which further exercises, whose aim is 
to strengthen the resolve with which the decision to secede was made, can operate. 
Referring to a term of Foucault, Sloterdijk refers to this inner space as ‘heterotopia’: 
‘spaces of radical difference, which, on the one hand, belong to the social fabric of a 
particular culture, but on the other hand are distinguished from the trivial continuum 
of the everyday because within them special rules, often contradictory to those which 
generally pertain, apply’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 345). Sloterdijk’s analysis clearly mirrors 
the analysis of the potential of askēsis to form ‘counter-cultures’ put forward by 
Valantasis, discussed above.  
 
Secession is accomplished by a ‘self-doubling’ or splitting of the self, ‘an 
asymmetrical self-doubling, in which the inner Other is associated as the superior 
partner, who occupies the position of ‘spiritual monitor’ of his charge, imparting to him 
‘the certainty that he is constantly observed, tested and harshly judged, but also, in 
the case of crisis, supported’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 363). One part of the self, the ‘vigilant 
self’, keeps watch over the other, checking for any weakness or backsliding, setting 
up a constant ‘endo-rhetorical’ dialogue in the split or doubled self (Sloterdijk 2009: 
364). We can see many examples of such endo-rhetorical dialogue in canonical 
ascetic texts in the Stoic and the Christian traditions.  
 
In St. John Climacus’s Divine Ladder of Ascent (Climacus 1982), the trainee 
monk/ascetic who has made the decision to embark on the ascetic life is enjoined to 
be vigilant about the former self: ‘We ought to be very careful to keep a watch on 
ourselves. When a harbour is full of ships it is easy for them to run against each 
other, particularly if they are secretly riddled by the worm of bad temper.’ (Climacus 
1982: 110).  One ‘half’ of the self is here charged with the task of keeping a check on 
the ‘unruliness’ of the other (as conveyed by the harbour/ships metaphor). The 
voices associated with each element of the doubled self, Sloterdijk argues, have 
three purposes (Sloterdijk 2009: 364).  
 
First, there are voices which reinforce the monk/trainee’s secession from the world, 
as exemplified by Step 3 of the ladder (On Exile): (Exile is) ‘an irrevocable 
renunciation of everything in one’s familiar surroundings that hinders one from 
attaining the ideal of holiness’ (Climacus 1982: 85). Second, there are voices which 
serve to strengthen the monk/trainee’s resolve and prevent backsliding, as 
exemplified in the following from Step 5 : ‘We ought to be on our guard, in case our 
conscience has stopped troubling us, not so much because of its being clear, but 
because of its being immersed in sin’ (Climacus 1982: 130). Third, there are voices 
of a ‘visionary’ nature, which keep the trainee’s eye fixed on the ‘reward’ to be gained 
by secession and the hardships it involves, as evidenced by the following from Step 
26: ‘The sun is bright when clouds have left the air; and a soul, freed of its old habits 
and also forgiven, has surely seen the divine light’ (Climacus 1982: 242). 
 
Such ‘endo-rhetorical’ inner dialogue can also be seen in Chapter 7 of the Rule of 
Benedict. As the monk/trainee progresses from the early stages of secession to the 
later, the vigilant ‘authority’ within the self is still portrayed as external – the  watchful 
eye of God: ‘let him (the monk) recall that he is always seen by God in heaven, that 
his actions everywhere are in God’s sight and are reported by the angels at every 
hour’ (Benedict 1982: 33). By the time the monk/trainee has reached the higher 
stages, the ‘external’ authority has now been transformed into an entirely internal 
vigilant authority, mirrored in the endo-rhetorical dialogue: ‘he should … constantly 
say in his heart…Lord, I am a sinner, not worthy to look up to heaven’ (Benedict 
1982: 38). As the vigilance of the ‘spiritual monitor’ replaces any need for ‘external’ 
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vigilance, the monk has no further need to speak: ‘a monk controls his tongue and 
remains silent, not speaking unless asked a question … a monk speaks gently and 
without laughter, seriously and with becoming modesty’ (Benedict 1982: 37). External 
silence thus betokens the fact that the internal endo-rhetorical dialogue is complete, 
and that a state of complete obedience has been attained. 
 
Other early Christian ascetic texts use similar metaphors to depict the struggle and 
dialogue between two selves within the monk/trainee: Gregory of Nyssa draws on the 
classical mythology of the centaur and the Minotaur to this end: ‘a man becomes 
double-natured, a centaur made up of reason and passion. It is possible to see many 
such people: either they resemble the Minotaur, being bull-headed in their belief in 
idolatry, although they appear to be leading a good life’ (Gregory of Nyssa 1967: 99). 
St. Basil personifies the self to be kept under vigilance as ‘the Renegade’ and uses 
metaphors of battle to depict the struggle with it: ‘Be assured, then, that you will not 
escape doing battle with the Renegade nor will you gain victory over him without 
much striving to observe the evangelical doctrines. How will you, stationed in the very 
thick of the battle, be able to win the contest against the Enemy?’ (Basil 1962: 18).  
 
5.2. ‘Conversion’ to organisational cultures 
 
How is the ascetic self brought to the point of deciding to ‘secede’? The analogy 
between this phenomenon and a religious ‘conversion’, as argued above, has some 
led writers to assume that this analogy signifies a real religious experience, 
particularly within the religious tradition of Christianity. If we examine ‘conversion’ in 
the wider philosophical sense of askēsis, however, we can differentiate different 
concepts of ‘conversion’ which are not necessarily connected to religion. The first 
such concept is the Platonic epistrophē or the turning away from the world of 
appearances towards a metaphysical reality, as set out in The Republic VII, 518c-d: 
‘the mind as a whole must be turned away from the world of change until its eye can 
bear to look straight at reality’ (518d)(Plato 1974: 322) 
 
Foucault (2005) characterizes the epistrophē in three aspects:  
 
The epistrophē ... consists first of all in turning away from appearances... as a 
way of turning away from something ... . Second: taking stock of oneself by 
acknowledging one’s own ignorance and by deciding precisely to care about 
the self, to take care of the self. And finally, the third stage, on the basis of 
this reversion to the self, which leads us to recollection, we will be able to 
return to our homeland, the homeland of essences, truth and Being. (209) 
 
Leaving the Platonic metaphysics of the soul on one side, we can see clearly in this 
description two crucial aspects of the epistrophē: firstly, it is essentially a pedagogic 
discourse a process through which knowledge about the self is gained, or, in Plato’s 
terms, regained. Second, the process takes time and usually occurs in stages or 
steps: the self is on an upward trajectory, as implicit in the metaphor of the ‘ladder’ 
which abounds in canonical depictions of the ascetic self, which we will outline in the 
next section. 
 
The Platonic concept is transformed in later Hellenistic and Roman thought, 
particularly in Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and most importantly, Seneca, into ‘the 
establishment of a complete, perfect, and adequate relationship of self to self’ 
(Foucault 2005: 210). In this ‘conversion of the self to the self’, ‘[se] convertere ad se, 
the essential element is much more exercise, practice, and training: askēsis rather 
than knowledge’ (Foucault : 2005: 210). In the Stoics this ‘conversion to self’ takes 
the form of a particular kind of exercise: a turning away from an (unhealthy) curiosity 
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about others, their motivations and deeds, and a (healthy) concern with our own, as 
exemplified by Marcus Aurelius: 
 
Do not waste the balance of life left to you in thoughts about other persons, ... 
I mean if you imagine to yourself what so and so is doing, and why; what he is 
saying or thinking or planning ... . Rather, you must, in the train of your 
thoughts ... habituate yourself only to thoughts about which if someone were 
suddenly to ask: ‘What is in your mind now?’, you would reply, quite frankly, 
this or that;  (Meditations III, 4)(Marcus Aurelius 2008: 17) 
 
The essence of ‘conversion’ as epistrophē, then, is a process of askēsis in which we 
view ourselves as on an upward trajectory, progress along which can only be 
maintained by means of constant exercise and vigilance. In terms of contemporary 
organizations, the ‘healthy’ (from the managerial perspective) concern with the self 
and its deficiencies would be the end point of askēsis and turning away, for instance, 
from an (unhealthy) concern with the deficiencies of the organization and its 
management. 
 
The second notion of conversion is that of metanoia, which can be translated as a 
change of mind on reflection. Foucault describes it as ‘a drastic change of mind, a 
radical renewal; … a sort of rebirth of the subject by himself, with death and 
resurrection at the heart of this as an experience of oneself and the renunciation of 
the self’ (2005: 216). Metanoia is often described as a sudden new awareness, ‘a 
bringing together and taking heed of that of which one has already been aware, but 
with which, due to the lack, up to now, of compelling circumstances, one has been 
unable to deal with in all its consequences’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 474). Metanoia, in other 
words, describes the bringing to consciousness of something which has already been 
present in the psyche, or to use religious language, the ‘soul’.  
 
If the Platonic epistrophē is associated with knowledge, and an upward trajectory 
from the world of appearances to the reality ‘beyond’, then metanoia is often 
associated a downward trajectory, and with what Arendt calls in Chapter 2 of Part 2 
of The Life of the Mind, ‘The Discovery of the Inner Man’. In the discovery of the 
‘inner man’ the stress is on the discovery of the faculty of the ‘will’, the ‘experiences 
caused man to become aware of the fact that they were capable of forming volitions’ 
(Arendt 1978: 52). This discovery of the ‘will’ comes about through a process of 
askēsis, inner conflict and extreme emotions: a dialogue ‘between me and myself’ 
(which) ‘takes place only in solitude, in a withdrawal from the world of appearances’ 
(Arendt 1978: 64).  
 
As a first paradigmatic example of this Arendt cites St. Paul’s description of his ‘inner 
wretchedness’ as depicted in the Letter to the Romans, 7, 19-25 (King James 
Version): 
 
For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I 
do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within 
me. 
So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close to hand. For 
I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another 
law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin 
which dwells in my members. Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me 
from this body of death? (Romans 7, 19-24) 
 
Arendt interprets this as an instance not just of the ‘will’ overcoming the 
‘unwillingness’ of the flesh, but the discovery of an ‘imperative that says … “Thou 
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shalt will” (and) puts me before a choice between an I-will and an I-will-not’ (Arendt 
1978: 68). The discovery of the will, therefore, can only be accomplished by my 
becoming aware of an inner resistance, a part of the self (in Paul’s terminology, the 
flesh) which is to be overcome.  
 
This inner process of askēsis thus results in an inner conflict, the only resolution of 
which is the discovery and exercise of the autonomous faculty of the will, which thus 
makes ‘conversion’ necessary. The key sentence in Arendt’s account is ‘Thou shalt 
will … and not mindlessly execute orders’ (69): thus the end point of organizational 
askesis is where the employee discovers their own capacity for autonomous volition, 
of becoming one’s ‘own manager’ and not just to execute orders. A similar struggle 
between ‘the willing’ part of the ego and the unwilling characterizes the Stoic askēsis, 
according to Arendt, but with the difference that in Epictetus ‘their frankly antagonistic 
relationship does not subject the self to the extremes of despair that we hear so 
much of in Paul’s lamentation’ (82). Most importantly for its analogous form in the 
contemporary organization, in the Stoic askēsis the will is subject to a programme of 
training to bring it into the required form. 
 
A similar askēsis can be seen in St. Augustine’s account of his conversion in the 
Confessions. Augustine’s moment of metanoia comes in Book 8, sections 19-30. The 
state of inner turmoil which he experiences in a Milan garden has been prepared for 
by a process of turning inward: we read in Section 16 ‘Lord, you turned my attention 
back to myself … you set me before my face … there was no way of escaping from 
myself’ (Augustine 2008: 144). In Section 19 he further describes this as a ‘grand 
struggle in my inner house’ (Augustine 2008: 146). In section 22 he describes a 
similar ‘split’ in the self as in St. Paul:  
 
The self which willed to serve was identical with the self which was unwilling. 
It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in conflict 
with myself and was dissociated from myself. (148) 
 
The resolution of this conflict in Section 29 when he hears the words ‘Pick up and 
read, pick up and read’ uttered by the voice of a child from a nearby house, and 
which he interprets as a divine command to open the gospel and read the words of 
St. Paul, is described as a ‘sudden moment’ but has been led up to by the process of 
askēsis described in the earlier part of Book 8, and is something which has been 
prepared in the first 8 books, which detail his turning away from his former life and 
beliefs. As Arendt says, in Augustine ‘the split occurs in the will itself; … it is the 
same willing ego that simultaneously wills and nills’ (Arendt 1978: 94), but ‘how the 
will, divided against itself, finally reaches the moment when it becomes “entire” 
remains a mystery’ (96).   
 
We can, then, interpret metanoia in the contemporary organizational setting as a 
psychological phenomenon, a process of inner conflict brought about by askēsis, in 
which the ego becomes aware of the autonomous faculty of the will, and the result of 
which is perhaps that the only ‘way out’ for the employee is to ‘convert’ and fully 
embrace the cultural prescriptions offered by management. As Sloterdijk puts it: 
 
What converts like to describe as an effect of grace, manifests itself from a 
psychological perspective as a gain in personal energy as a consequence of 
an increased integration. This occurs when the entire apparatus of psychic 
impulses is brought under a unifying perspective of meaning. (Sloterdijk 2009: 
480). 
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How does this translate into the prescriptions of management writers? The tendency 
of some ‘change consultants’ to appropriate the language of metanoia to describe 
commitment to new organizational practices has been noted by scholars (Ackers and 
Preston, 1997, Turnbull, 2000, 2001). The former strongly critique the notion that 
such spiritually-packaged ‘process consultancy’ can do any more than create a 
‘feelgood factor’: ‘the ecstatic experience soon fades, once managers return to 
mundane realities; just as after every Billy Graham rally, thousands return to their old 
ways’ (Ackers and Preston, 1997: 697).  
 
Turnbull, writing a little later than Ackers and Preston (2000, 2001) was less 
sanguine than they about the effects of cultural change interventions packaged in 
spiritual language. She felt that despite evidence of their continuing professional skill, 
many of the managers in the organization she studied had been significantly affected 
by ‘socio-psychological coercion’. Like Tourish and Tourish (2010) her conclusion is 
that such transfer of the language of religious conversion into the secular domain is 
dangerous: ‘I do not share Ackers and Preston’s optimism that the... potentially 
damaging and highly transient rhetoric of such programmes have only short term 
effects on their participants. I fear that even when the “ecstatic experience fades” the 
emotional experiences will remain’ (Turnbull 2001: 27).    
 
 
5.3 The perfectionist vita and the exemplary ascetic narrative 
 
Having ‘seceded’ and having embarked upon a ‘conversion’ of the type we have 
argued for in the previous section, the ascetic self needs a model or exemplary 
narrative against which to judge its progress towards the goal of perfection. This is 
provided by what Sloterdijk calls the exemplary ‘perfectionist vita,’ and closely related 
to this the metaphor of (organizational) life as consisting of the ascent of a ladder, 
whose upper end represents the ideal to be attained. The purpose of these two 
closely related forms of ‘exercise’ is the ‘activation of a latent ideal of perfection’ at 
the end of which is ‘the promise of an irresistible victory prize, comparable to the 
athlon for which Greek athletes competed’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 382). In its prototypical 
form in Stoic and early Christian texts, Sloterdijk shows, the ladder is divided into a 
varying number of rungs, and the texts indicate by means of behavioural 
prescriptions and examples which ascetic disciplines are necessary to ascend the 
ladder and to achieve the ideal of perfection at its upper end.  
 
In Seneca’s seminal Stoic text the Letters to Lucilius we see an early prototype of 
such a ‘ladder’, consisting of three grades of Stoic virtue (Sloterdijk 2009: 390). In 
Letter 71 Seneca refers to two categories of person: one who has attained the first 
grade or stage, ‘the neophyte who is pressing onwards and upwards in the cultivation 
of his moral powers’ but who, ‘near though he may draw to the perfect good, yet ... 
has not given it the completing touch, will now and again fall back and partially relax 
the tension of his will’ (Seneca 1932: 253). This is contrasted with ‘the man who has 
attained beatitude, whose moral force is fully developed, is best pleased with himself 
when he has tested himself most soundly; he not only endures but takes to himself 
what others dread’ (Seneca 1932: 253). 
 
In Letter 75 Seneca develops this schema into a full ‘three-fold division’:  the ‘first 
degree’ or ‘class of proficient’ consisting of ‘those who do not yet possess the true 
wisdom, yet stand in its neighbourhood. ... Those who have already disburdened 
themselves of all passions and vices, who have learnt those truths a grasp of what 
was essential, but their confidence is not yet based on experience’ (Seneca 1932: 
276). The second degree consists of ‘those who have put away the passions as well 
as the gravest spiritual ailments, but without establishing beyond doubt their title to a 
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sense of immunity. They may in fact relapse.’ (Seneca 1932: 276). One who has 
attained the third degree ‘has escaped from avarice but still feels anger; or it is no 
longer tempted by the lust of the flesh, but still by the lust of the parade’ (Seneca 
1932: 276).   
 
In the early Christian ascetics, the rudimentary three stages of Seneca’s prototypical 
schema have been replaced by a much more developed ladder, its most 
sophisticated forms being the Ladder of Divine Ascent of St. John Climacus 
(Climacus 1982) and Chapter 7 of the Rule of  Benedict (Benedict 1982). Climacus’s 
ladder has thirty rungs, which are grouped together into three phases (the analogy 
with the three phases of Stoic virtue of Seneca can clearly be seen). Benedict has 12 
‘degrees’ through which the monk must progress to reach the ideal of perfection.  
The first phase of Climacus’s Divine Ladder, represented by steps 1-3, constitute the 
‘break with the world’ or what Sloterdijk calls ‘secession’. Having renounced the 
world, the trainee ascetic enters the second phase, which consists of steps 4-26. 
This phase, described by Climacus as ‘the practice of the virtues’, has a dialectical 
structure consisting of the definition of each vice, discussion of its sources, and 
suggestion of remedies for it. Climacus makes extensive use of narrative anecdotes 
to illustrate those who have overcome the vices, and strives to keep a balance 
between the negative (condemnation of the vice) and the positive (remedies and 
hopes for overcoming it). Having reached step 26, the trainee enters the third and 
final phase, union with God, or the fully contemplative life. 
 
What is the purpose of the ladder in the context of a cultural theory of the ascetic life? 
Ware (1982), in his introduction to The Ladder gives a number of pointers to how it 
should be interpreted. First, the ascent is intended to be a struggle – we cannot 
‘climb the ladder in a single stride’ – but must expect to fall back. Second, we should 
not interpret the ladder metaphor too literally ‘the different steps are not to be 
regarded as strictly consecutive ... if we progress to the higher stages ... (we) 
simultaneously develop on the lower’ (Ware 1982: 16). The essence of the ladder 
can, then. be described as a ‘dialectical theology’: rather than providing a simple 
‘scale’ against which we can measure ourselves, it functions, rather, to promote 
reflection and (endo-rhetorical) dialogue in the trainee ascetic between ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ aspects of the ‘soul’ or psyche (Ware 1982: 21).The ladder, therefore, is 
not an explicit code or set or rules but rather a way of promoting inner reflection, and 
method of gaining acceptance by the trainee/employee of life as a constant ‘test’, 
‘spiritual exercise’ or training programme. 
 
5.4. Organizational cultures as ‘cultures of observance’ 
 
In Wittgenstein’s ‘Remarks on Culture and Value’ (Wittgenstein 1980), we find the 
following remark, written in 1949:   
 
Culture is an observance. Or at least it presupposes an observance. (Remark 
83e)   
 
In the original German the word is Ordensregel, which has the connotation of 
‘monastic rule’. Whether explicitly understood as such by Wittgenstein or not, 
Sloterdijk argues, this conception of culture is an implicitly ascetic one, in the sense 
that monastic rule is ‘a set of prescriptions that cannot be grounded further, and 
which together provide the image of a form of life’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 214). The notion 
of ‘culture’ invoked by Wittgenstein, Sloterdijk argues, consists of a form of life, 
habits, practices, rituals, which are developed in the idea of a ‘secession’ from the 
mundane, ‘real’ world.  
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The essence of organizational culture as an ‘observance’, then, is a modus vivendi, 
‘which in its explicitness, rigour, vigilance and reduction to essentials can be 
compared to existence within a monastic order’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 216). The ‘rule of 
rules’ in this community of observance is the maxim ‘you must change your life!’: 
‘those participating in exercises become aware of their exercises as exercises, that is 
as engaging forms of life’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 229).  
 
Organizational culture is essentially, at least in the eyes of the management theorists 
cited earlier, one of dedication to a single cause – such as making profit and serving 
‘the customer’. In an everyday ‘outside’ culture, one is not ‘ever asked if one wishes 
to sub-ordinate oneself to its rules’ indeed one does not ask oneself ‘whether there 
are any rules at all’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 215). The idea of being aware of rules, or of 
voluntarily submitting oneself to them while clearly the case in the monastery, it might 
be objected, is hardly the case with the contemporary organization: if there are such 
rules, then one does not voluntarily submit oneself to them, but is obliged to do so if 
one wishes to be employed there. Further, in the era which seemingly rejects the 
‘pathological asceticism’ argued for earlier in this paper, individuals are unlikely to 
voluntarily submit to ascetic rules of this explicit kind. Monastic rules, however, 
consist of both explicit and implicit ascetic rules.   
 
There are three basic types of monastic rules with varying degrees of explicitness 
(Derwich 2000). First, there are monastic rules which define the main principles and 
spirit of monastic life, describing the programme of spiritual formation. These 
systems of rules tend to be written down, apply to the whole Order, but can also be 
adapted according to the needs of an individual monastery. Second, ‘customaries’ 
describe details of the practice of everyday life, such as taking meals, working and 
sleeping, and are not always written down. Thirdly, there are constitutions and 
monastic statutes, which establish the institutional framework for the development of 
monasticism.  
 
Within the contemporary ascetic organization, analogously, there may be differing 
degrees of explicitness of ascetic practices: explicit codes governing the general 
spirit of life, such as mission and vision statements, and accompanying visions of 
how the individual can attain ‘perfection’ in the context of these ideals. Here the 
system of communication, in particular the communication of the path to perfection 
set out by exemplary narratives, plays a crucial role. At the other end of the scale, 
and particularly important for contemporary organizations intent on establishing 
patterns of ‘engaging life’ in ‘secessionist’ cultures, are implicit patterns of behaviour, 
rituals, and habits, which, for this reason, can be even more important and pernicious 
than explicit rules, as they are ultimately arbitrary, their sole justification being 
cultural: ‘the way we do things here’ (this seems to be the crux of Wittgenstein’s 
point). Whatever the degree of explicitness or implicitness or rules, however, the 
fundamental tenet of organizational life as askēsis is that: ‘regardless of which 
particular prescriptions are at issue, it demands ... that each step, each movement of 
the hand be carried out with meditative care, and that each word be spoken 
prudently’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 214).   
 
Once this implicit ‘rule of rules’ is followed, then, the vigilance which is required of the 
trainee/employee becomes ‘habit’: there is no need of further rules or their 
enforcement. ‘Habit’ here, however, should not be understood as an unthinking or 
unconscious carrying out of tasks. Sloterdijk here distinguishes two types of 
possession of self, as originally expressed in philosophical form in Heraclitus’s 
Fragment 102: ‘Ēthos anthrópo daimon’.  Sloterdijk interprets this as saying that 
there is in the human being a fundamental conflict between ‘The lower, the habitual 
foundation, and the higher, the demonic’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 258). Life is thus 
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interpreted as conflict between two forms of possession: possession by the habitual, 
the everyday and the routine on the one hand, and by the ‘demonic’, inspiration by 
higher ideas on the other, or as Sloterdijk puts it: ‘The human being is, in principle, 
suspended between two types of being possessed: possessed by habit and lethargy, 
he appears inanimate and mechanical; possessed by passions and ideas he appears 
over-animated and manically driven’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 266). The goal of 
organisational askēsis, accordingly, is to convert the lower, mechanical and habitual 
into the higher by means of exercise, albeit a form of the higher which is controlled 
and not susceptible to the manic element of Heraclitus’s ‘demonic’.  
 
In describing the conversion of the habitual into a ‘higher’ form of possession 
Sloterdijk refers to two concepts of ‘possession’ present in Greek philosophy and 
also in later, Scholastic notions of virtue. In Plato’s Phaedrus, sections 244a-245b, 
for instance, we find an account of how the ‘manic’ elements of possession (or divine 
madness as Plato describes it) can be converted into a more ‘productive’ form of 
inspiration. There Socrates says: ‘If it were true without qualification that madness is 
an evil, that would be all very well, but in fact madness, provided it comes as a gift of 
heaven, is the channel by which we receive the greatest blessings’ (Plato 1981: 46) 
Similarly, Aristotle, in the Nichomachean Ethics, uses the term hexis to indicate a 
state of inner possession, where the virtuous person has brought under control the 
instinctual and habitual.  
 
The task of trainee under askēsis, as Sloterdijk expresses it, is to ‘achieve a reversal 
of the relationship of possession and bring what possesses him under his own 
direction’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 269). Instead of habits possessing him or her, in other 
words, the employee must become capable of possessing his or her habits. This 
process, which can only be brought by means of exercise, is one of ‘de-
automatization’ and ‘re-automatization’ of behaviour: ‘the adept subjugates himself to 
a rigorous exercise regime, through which he de-automatizes his behaviour in every 
important respect. At the same time he must re-automatize his newly learnt 
behaviour, so that what he aspires to be or to constitute becomes second nature 
(Sloterdijk 2009: 269). 
 
The aim of organizational cultures understood as ‘cultures of observance’, then, is to 
bring about in each employee a ‘de-automatization’ of habitual behaviour, and, 
through a process of askēsis, a process of ‘re-automatization’ of new behaviour in 
line with the ideals of the secessionist culture. 
 
5.5 Implications for organizational theory 
 
Sloterdijk’s theory of human sphere building contributes to a re-conceptualization of 
organizational ‘cultures’ as agglomerations of shifting and co-existing cells or 
spheres, formed by relationships of contagion and imitation (Borch 2009). His work 
on askēsis in particular, presented here, for which the wider work on the theory of 
spheres provides a context, arguably constitutes a basis on which a theory of ascetic 
norms and culture formation in organizations can be built, following on from the 
implicit treatment of asceticism in organizations in the work of Alvesson and Willmott 
(2002), Garsten and Grey (1997), Townley (1993, 1995) and Costea et al.(2008), 
among others.  
 
Sloterdijk’s work builds on the later work of Foucault on asceticism, already 
extensively applied in the field of organizational theory (Townley 1995, Starkey and 
Hatchuel 2002, Kelly et al. 2007, Bardon and Josserand 2011). Its validity, however, 
does not depend on our prior acceptance of an ethical project, or on our being able to 
identify and maintain a distinction between religious and non-religious forms of 
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askēsis in organizations. In emphasizing a continuity between the religious and non-
religious forms of askēsis in contemporary organizations, seeing ascetic practices as 
‘de-spiritualized regimes of exercise’, this avoids the necessity of invoking a religious 
discourse in explanation of them, and therefore of attributing ‘humanistic’ aims to 
contemporary management practices whose implications are expressly non-
humanistic (Ackers and Preston 1997, Turnbull 2000, 2002, Sørensen 2008).  
 
Power and control in ‘secessionist’ cultures, as expounded here, is exercised by 
means of implicit ascetic ideals rather than direct control, in particular by the setting 
up of exemplars of ‘perfection’ which employees are to follow, and by the 
internalization of mechanisms of ‘observance’, in which habitual behaviour is 
constantly questioned and ‘re-automatized’ in line with these implicit ascetic aims. 
This view of organizations and management, therefore, is in line with Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s (2005: 76) conceptualization of managerial discourses in the present 
‘spirit of capitalism’ as being founded on a moralizing process, the aim of which is 
that ‘everyone knows what to do without having to be told’. 
 
Finally, the idea that organizational selves are ‘split’ by these processes of askēsis 
into ‘vigilant’ and ‘renegade’, ‘willing’ and the ‘unwilling’ elements which are 
constantly in ‘endo-rhetorical’ dialogue, carries further the deconstruction of the 
identify/dis-identify binary which has been carried out in the recent work of Fleming 
and Spicer (2003, 2004) and Contu (2008). There is no pre-existing autonomous self 
upon which cultural power in organizations works but, following Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology which forms the basis of much of Sloterdijk’s work in the 
area, selves which are, at the same time, ‘in’ the culture and detached from it. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
It has been out aim to argue for the importance of Sloterdijk’s theory of askēsis as a 
means of understanding the relationship between the putative autonomous 
organizational self and the formation of organizational cultures. The original 
contribution of this to the field of organizational culture stems from its embedding 
within a comprehensive theory of human sphere building in the tradition of 
philosophical anthropology (Sloterdijk 1998-2004). The key elements of this theory 
which have important applications to organizational theory, as set out by Borch 
(2009), are its emphasis on processes of imitation, immunization, and transformation 
of the self in line with the maxim ‘you must change your life’ as being central to 
cultural formation within organizations. 
 
According to this theory, we should see organizational cultures as ‘secessionist’ 
cultures which may inhere within or alongside existing cultures, brought about by 
engendering a ‘split’ and ‘endo-rhetorical’ dialogue in the organizational self between 
a ‘vigilant’ element and another element which is to be watched over, or between the 
‘willing’ and the ‘unwilling’ self. The relative importance of these two elements will be 
related to the degree of progress of the ascetic/trainee towards latent ideals of 
‘perfection’ within the secessionist culture, or the imitation of the ‘perfectionist vita’, 
consisting of exemplary narratives of devotion, self-sacrifice or commitment within 
the organization. In the mind of the employee this reflection on progress will often 
take the form of the metaphor of a ‘ladder’ which is to be ascended, towards the goal 
of perfection. 
 
Rather than a binary opposition between the autonomous self and the fully 
committed self which has been ‘converted’ to the organizational culture, what we 
have in practice are selves which are at various stages of akēsis towards the top end 
of the ladder. It is our argument that we need not employ religious or even ‘spiritual’ 
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discourse to describe this process. In arguing this we are not anti-religious, but 
sceptical that, by describing the process of conversion as ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ we 
are still lending too much credence to the claims of postmodern management theory 
to be ‘humanistic’, and downplaying the emotional and psychological costs to the 
employee of organizational culture programmes. In examining two paradigmatic 
cases of ‘religious’ conversion we have shown that, notwithstanding the employment 
of religious discourse by the subjects of these ‘conversions’ to describe their 
experiences, what they describe in reality is a process of inner turmoil brought about 
by askēsis, through which the ‘willing self’ or ‘inner man’ (Arendt) is discovered. It is 
the discovery of this ‘willing self’ which we maintain is the aim of organizational 
culture programmes to bring about, a process which has no religious or spiritual 
justification as such. 
 
Finally, the ultimate aim of organizational cultures understood as ‘cultures of 
observance’ is the bringing about of an attitude in the employee in which they 
constantly examine their habitual behaviour, and ‘re-automatize’ a new, examined, 
behaviour in line with the aims of the secessionist culture. The end point of this 
process of askēsis is reached when the employee conceives of organizational life 
itself as a constant ‘test’ of commitment. These ideals, when employed in the 
monastery in the purpose of serving God, might arguably lead to the realization of 
monastic virtues of benevolence and humility; when employed in the organizational 
setting, as the management theorists cited at the beginning of this article advocate, 
they lead to emotional insecurity and psychological damage, as the extensive 
literature on the subject shows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
 
Notes 
 
1 All translations from this and Sloterdijk’s other works are the authors’. 
2 Translations from Plessner are the authors’. 
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